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interventionist/protectionist stance, the UK would leave itself exposed to reciprocal behaviour by other countries, thereby disadvantaging UK businesses.  Of the three dimensions we examine, UK antitrust enforcement has the greatest scope for divergence from the EU, but immediate changes would create regulatory uncertainty for businesses and instability for the CMA.
POLICY ISSUES
 As a priority, the CMA should be allocated sufficient funds to manage the significantly increased workload that will accompany the UK's withdrawal from the EU.  A continued commitment to the current competition regime would: (i) mitigate some of the uncertainties surrounding the UK's future relationship with the EU, and (ii) improve the likelihood of more open trade agreements.  There is a rational basis for repealing the ministerial power to propose new public interest grounds in lieu of primary legislation (s.58(3) Enterprise Act 2002), in order to avoid the risk of a post-Brexit influx of new public interest grounds in UK merger control.  'Self-restraining' legislation, which restricts the circumstances where state aid can be granted (e.g. to where it is clearly justifiable), may be required to ensure good trade relations and political discipline.  While it may be beneficial for the UK to move towards a fully criminalised cartel enforcement regime in the long-term, the short-term requires UK antitrust enforcement to remain broadly aligned to EU rules and case law (thereby delivering much-needed continuity and certainty for businesses).
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